Brussels, Belgium – 1 April 2012
European Union plans to launch ship-based strikes against land targets in Somalia have come under fire from experts who say such action would carelessly endanger civilian lives and destroy Western anti-piracy efforts in the region. Proposals for the multilateral offensive were approved by European Defence Ministers on 23 March.
International naval forces have already been widely criticised for failing to effectively tackle the regional piracy problem. Despite naval forces from the US Combined Task Force 151 and EU Operation Atalanta patrolling the waterways surrounding the Gulf of Aden, there were still 237 attempted and 28 successful hijackings in 2011 according to the International Maritime Bureau. The impact on international trade has been measured with equally grim metrics. The total cost of Somali-based piracy in 2011 has been estimated at USD 6.9 billion (GBP 4.3 billion). Additionally, US based not-for-profit One Earth Foundation has estimated security equipment costs and insurance for shipping alone to total USD 1.7 billion (GBP 1.1 billion).
According to EU figures, 10 ships and 189 people are currently being held hostage in Somalia, and 24 sailors died due to pirate activity in 2011. Sources tell DefenceReport that the escalation of EU anti-piracy operations, including the proposed bombardment of coastal Somali pirate positions, risks fostering anti-Western resentment and will prove counter-productive.
Peter Chalk, Senior Analyst at the RAND Cooperation, condemned the EU proposal, saying “How do you ensure that the shelling will only impact confirmed pirates, and not the fishing communities in which they are ingratiated?” Robert Young Pelton, regional commentator and editor of local news outlet SomaliaReport, added that land strikes against suspected pirate positions would create large amounts of “collateral damage” and, worse, an angry backlash against Western forces. “Launching kinetic attacks onshore opens up a potentially ugly scenario,” he said. “Right now, most of the coastal communities want international help in getting the pirates out. That could change,” Pelton added.
EU agrees on escalation
The criticism came after confirmation by Spanish and German officials that the EU anti-piracy forces will now be permitted to operate against targets in Somalia’s coastal regions. It is understood this extension will permit heavy shelling by surface vessels and surface attacks by carrier-based aircraft on fuel depots, suspected pirate vessels, ammunition dumps and any infrastructure connected to pirate activities.
This large-scale escalation of combat operations is supported by the UK, which has rotated 11 ships through regional anti-piracy operations since 2007. In February 2012, it was reported that the UK MoD was already drafting operational plans for air strikes in Somalia. When contacted by DefenceReport, an FCO spokesperson declined to comment on operational details but confirmed that the escalation was part of Westminster’s Somalia strategy.
In addition, a December 2011 Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee report advised naval forces to keep their “rules of engagement (ROE) under regular review.” Should Somali pirates’ tactics change, the committee said, the Navy was to be prepared to respond with equal or greater force against land targets in the country. DefenceReport has also learned from an EU source that participating navies are supposed to agree on ROE before land strikes are authorized. These criteria are said to include an intelligence survey, reasonable attempts to avoid collateral damage, coordination with Somali authorities and suitably accurate assets for delivering ordnance.
ISR limitations explored
Despite these precautions, piracy experts were deeply critical of the EU’s new strategy. Martin Murphy, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and anti-piracy expert, told DefenceReport that, were the EU to launch these attacks as planned, they would tarnish the organisation’s already weak image amongst Somalis. “US land strikes have not been welcomed and the EU is likely to be seen as just like America,” Murphy said. He also cast doubt on the EU’s operational capacity to conduct strikes accurately or with any great intensity. “They should have reasonable SIGINT (signals intelligence)” – the kind routinely gathered by “regular aerial surveillance” – which the EU lacks in the region.
An EU Atalanta spokesperson told DefenceReport that there are currently six European vessels patrolling in the area. Of these, four are frigates, and these are augmented by Sea Lynx helicopter assets. The mission’s flagship vessel, currently the German combat supply vessel FGS Berlin, also operates an additional two Sea King MK41 helicopters. Given this force’s geographical distribution over an operational area of two million square nautical miles (30 times the size of England), it is difficult to believe this concentration of aircraft could be sufficiently applied to detailed coastal reconnaissance, explained Chalk.
The Sea King MK41 has an operational range of roughly 600 nautical miles; the Lynx has an operational range of 280 nautical miles. He also said that the lack of surveillance assets would make potential land strikes dangerously inaccurate. “Drones could potentially be useful here,” he added, “but the EU has no way of operating them in the region.” Even if unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets were to become available – notionally flown out of EU bases in Uganda – aerial surveillance alone would also likely prove insufficient. “Technical means are fine but only get you so far”, explained Murphy. “EU forces have a critical lack of human intelligence.”
Pelton agreed that the EU’s track record on harnessing local knowledge and intelligence is dangerously insufficient. “The Navy’s doing a terrible job of coordinating with local security forces,” who, he says, should be given information and be tasked to provide law enforcement. As an illustration of the potential for tragedy, he highlighted a lethal civilian casualty incident last week, when an as yet unidentified international task force helicopter’s guns strafed a Yemeni-based fishing boat in the region.
Economic motivations are key
Few disagree that the physical destruction of skiffs and weapons would increase the physical and monetary costs for pirates engaged in criminal activities. But the emerging consensus is that land strikes would only produce short-term gains at high human cost, especially if concerted efforts are not made to confront the economic pressures pulling many Somalis towards piracy in the first place. With US forces tied down to operations in Afghanistan and European militaries facing stark budget cut-backs, the likelihood of any comprehensive mission to address internal Somali security is remote. “There is no appetite for a major nation-building operation in Somalia,” Chalk said. “Without a dedicated effort on land, piracy will continue to be a viable livelihood for Somalis. You cannot fight that economic incentive with force alone.”
Feature photo and Inset photo / EU Navfor