Report: Lessons from US Joint Operations (1989-1999)

11 November 2016

by Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Tobias Burgers

Full Report Here

The challenge of integrating interagency and multinational partners was a stumbling block for the Afghan Theatre of Operations. Romaniuk and Burgers build on their previous report and delve into the creation of the Joint Task Forces during Grenada, the First Gulf War and the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. The conclusion of their report is worrying as it seems that we have not learned the lessons from our past.

 

Feature photo / USAF aircraft of the 4th Fighter Wing (F-16, F-15C and F-15E) fly over Kuwaiti oil fires – Wikimedia Commons, 2016

DefenceReport’s Analysis is a multi-format blog that is based on opinions, insights and dedicated research from DefRep editorial staff and writers. The analysis expressed here are the author’s own and are separate from DefRep reports, which are based on independent and objective reporting.


Scott Nicholas Romaniuk is a Staff Analyst for DefenceReport and a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, University of Trento (Italy). His research focuses on asymmetric warfare, terrorism and counterterrorism, international security, and the use of force. Email: scott.romaniuk@unitn.it. Tobias Burgers is currently a Doctoral Candidate at the Otto Suhr Institute, Free University Berlin, from which he holds a diploma in political science. His research interests include the impact of cyber and robotic technology on security dynamics, East-Asian security relations, maritime security and the future of conflict. Email: burgers@zedat.fu-berlin.de.


Content on this site may not be reproduced without express permission from DefRep editorial staff. Images comply with Creative Commons usage rights. DefenceReport logo, colours and branding are exclusive property of DefenceReport.com. © 2015 DefenceReport.com