3 December 2024
With Donald Trump poised to return to the White House in 2025, American allies must prepare for an era where the United States prioritizes support for those who can help themselves. As the United States and its allies confront revanchist powers––Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China––countries in Europe must adapt to a more self-reliant defence posture as American interest zeroes in on the threat posed by China in the Pacific.
The second Trump administration will face an unstable world: Ukraine’s ongoing war, multiple Middle Eastern conflicts, and a looming Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which American intelligence projects China’s military aims to be capable of by 2027––and may pull the trigger on by 2030. While the next administration is unlikely to completely abandon its partners in unstable regions as it focuses on China, it will almost certainly prioritize those partners who bring complementary capabilities to the table.
Allies must recognize that reliance on US military largesse is no longer sustainable––or desirable. American officials and policymakers will increasingly demand that allies close capability gaps, modernize their militaries, and increase defence spending to face these existential threats.
America’s European allies face one of the most acute threats in Russia. In an interview with Germany’s Der Spiegel, General Christopher Cavoli, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said he believes that regardless of how the war in Ukraine ends, the Russian army will emerge stronger than it is now. That is bad news for Europe as it empties its military stockpiles to send to Ukraine and cannot quickly restore its stockpiles.
According to the Kiel Institute, Russia’s manufacturing capacity has grown to the point where it can produce the equivalent of the German Bundeswehr’s entire arsenal in just over half a year. Germany is Europe’s largest spender on defence, despite constitutional limits. Since the attack on Ukraine, Russia has significantly increased its capacity to produce key weapons systems—by a factor of two for long-range air defence systems, for example, and by a factor of three for tanks.
As the war in Ukraine has shown, a modern battlefield in Europe is going to involve significant attrition of equipment, infrastructure and personnel––all the more reason the Americans cannot fight a war in both Europe and the Pacific. At these production levels, it’s an open question whether a combined Europe can withstand Russian aggression. As much as everyone likes to scoff at the notion that Russian troops could defeat European NATO members in combat, I would remind you that Russian troops have now had years of high-intensity combat training while military experience in Europe is largely concentrated in special forces.
Gentle reminders that they are not doing enough to defend themselves won’t work. Strong rhetoric from European defence ministers won’t cut it. They need to implement a decades-long rearmament, and it needs to start now. It really should have started the moment Russian troops crossed Ukraine’s border. America’s European allies need a sink-or-swim moment––and that is exactly what I predict the Trump administration will demand of them. Europe needs to hold its own, not weigh down the US as it focuses attention on China.
As urgent as the threat is, the unfortunate reality is that building military capabilities does not happen overnight. It will take years of spending to match the capabilities European countries had two decades ago. Europe has awful demographics, a stagnating economy and an anti-war culture. There is a lot that needs to go right for Europe to be self-sufficient and it is by no means a given. That does not excuse inaction, however.
Budgets will have to rise––and inefficiencies in spending and acquisitions must be cut––, equipment that cannot be purchased in the near term must be ordered from abroad, and long-term manufacturing on the continent must be given priority. The ranks will have to be filled, likely by offering more money, and a military culture will have to be instilled in Europe’s youth. Perhaps the continent needs to relook national military service.
While Trump’s calls for increased defence spending for NATO allies ruffled feathers in his first administration, it was effective in forcing other countries to increase their spending. The Biden administration’s “return to normalcy” saw NATO allies slow the growth of spending but, fortunately, did not halt it. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine injected much-needed urgency into Europe’s rearmament, but it disappointingly has not resulted in concrete action.
Despite defence spending in Europe reaching €552 billion in 2023––four times the Russian military’s latest budget––serious capability deficits persist. Production delays for basic equipment like artillery ammunition reveal systemic weakness. A fragmented defence industry spread across 30 countries means immense inefficiencies, and a lack of interoperability and represents a headache for anyone managing logistics. Compared to the US, which operates 32 types of major weapons systems, European NATO members operate 172.
Coordinating a defence acquisition policy among 30 different countries is no easy task. As I said, a lot has to go right for Europe to become self-sufficient, but it is what is necessary for the trans-Atlantic alliance to confront both China and Russia. Even if the Americans wanted to stay in Europe, they couldn’t do so.
Poland offers a blueprint for an effective defence policy. With defence spending projected to hit 4.7% of GDP by 2025, Warsaw has set the standard for European military preparedness. Its initiatives include major investments in equipment like the F-35 and tanks from the US and South Korea and plans to expand the size of its military to 300,000 personnel. Poland demonstrates that with political will and strategic focus, Europe’s defence shortcomings can be addressed.
With the Russians expected to have reconstituted their military regardless of the outcome in Ukraine by the 2030s, what can be expected of China, which has a free hand to bulk up its military power? While China has no recent military experience, it’s massive spending and clear goals in terms of capabilities will certainly result in a more capable military than it has today.
The West is in a new era of strategic competition. If Europe and other allies fail to act decisively, they risk becoming spectators at best––and victims at worst––in their defence. Sustained investment, strategic planning, and a willingness to confront political and cultural inertia are the only paths to ensuring security and sovereignty.
As the global order evolves, America’s allies must meet the moment—not just for their own survival but to secure the world order rooted in freedom and stability. Tough love is the wake-up call they need to win the long game.
Featured Photo: “NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meeting with Trump at the White House, 19 November 2019”, NATO Image, 2024