This year has proved dramatic for Europe’s leadership. Despite ample warnings from the Trump administration and its surrogates about a pivot away from long-standing security commitments in Europe to focus on China, European leaders were unprepared, suddenly facing the urgent necessity of bolstering their defence capabilities.
Days before the Munich Security Conference, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that Europe must take full responsibility for its security, with no foreseeable NATO membership for Ukraine and no US security commitment for European troops in Ukraine. Later, at the conference, U.S. Vice President JD Vance left Europe reeling after declaring the real threat to European security lies in unregulated migration, the exclusion of right-wing political groups, and restrictions on free speech. At the end of February, President Trump’s contentious meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy put real fear and urgency into the minds of European leaders concerning continental defence. All of this raises a serious concern. Why, when Trump and his surrogates have made their plans eminently visible, have European leaders been caught off guard at every turn?
Still, in the aftermath of these shocking events, European leaders have voiced their support for taking on more defence responsibilities and massively increasing spending. The question now is whether that sense of urgency and planned spending will translate into tangible military power. While it’s all well and good for small countries like the Baltic states, and medium-sized countries like Poland to spend in the neighbourhood of 5% of GDP on defence, what matters more is what the Big Three European NATO countries of Germany, France and the UK do. Those countries will move the needle on European defence capabilities. The European Union unveiled its ambitious “ReArm Europe” plan, committing some €800 billion towards defence enhancement, although the timeframe for this expenditure remains somewhat ambiguous. Among other things, the plan includes €150 billion in loans to buy air defences, artillery, missiles, drones and anti-drone systems.
Germany, the largest defence spender in Europe, has announced ambitious spending goals of 3% of GDP by 2028 and 3.5% by 2030. These numbers may not satisfy the Trump administration, which is calling for 5% of GDP. However, spending is only half the issue – what they will spend the money on is the more important issue. Spending Euros and Pounds will take time to translate into trained soldiers, new weapons systems and logistics systems.
Concerns are already surfacing in Germany regarding the practical implementation of these vast sums. The German Taxpayers Association have argued that bureaucracy and inefficiency are the primary obstacles and that without any administrative reform, the defence sector will face the same bottlenecks that plague other areas of German public investment. There’s also the issue of how Europe will afford this new defence spending. Funding a massive military expansion inevitably requires substantial tax increases or painful cuts to established social programs, particularly in healthcare and pensions. Both options are politically toxic, despite a majority of the public in Germany being supportive of increasing defence spending.
Germany’s demographic reality exacerbates this dilemma. The nation’s pay-as-you-go pension system, established in 1889, is already under immense strain, consuming a third of the federal budget (€127 billion in 2024) – a figure projected to nearly double by 2050. With a shrinking worker-to-retiree ratio (6:1 in 1960, currently 2:1 and falling) and a large, politically active pensioner demographic, significant cuts to retirement benefits or increases in contributions might not be so attractive when people realize they will have less money in their pockets. This fiscal pressure cooker creates a challenging environment for sustained, high-level defence investment.
Moreover, some of the supposed “fixes” for these economic and demographic concerns, including mass immigration, are deeply unpopular and will almost certainly lead to social tensions and perhaps outright violence and warfare in the future. This reality in Europe means that it is in the short-term interest of European leaders to make big public statements, allow the real spending to be stymied by bureaucracy and try to wait Trump’s term out.
But then what? The Trump administration will spend the next four years shifting assets away from Europe (though they are increasing their American presence in Poland) towards China. The American defence establishment will be geared towards conflict in the Pacific, and what guarantee is there that the next American president (which might be Trump if he finds or creates a workaround on term limits) will be inclined to refocus on Europe?
Betting your security on the actions of whoever resides in the White House is not a winning strategy. If Europe is going to be sovereign, hard and unpopular choices must be made. Unfortunately, politicians are not known for their courage. However, if Europe is serious about defence, the continent must triage short, medium, and long-term options. The French demand that weapons fielded by European armies be made in Europe is, without question, a good long-term goal which will ensure European sovereignty and security. Still, it is pretty impossible in the short term, as it would take many years for European defence contractors to ramp up to suitable production levels that would satisfy all European needs for all systems. That would, in effect, prevent a significant near-term rearmament in Europe.
Realism is the only solution here, and Europe will likely have to buy off the shelf from around the world to bridge some capability gaps. Countries like South Korea likely offer the most attractive and quick turnaround times for sophisticated weapons systems. Though buying from another country creates issues, such as potential compatibility with future European and American-made systems, the downsides are far smaller than the opportunity for tangible capabilities to deter Russia in the short term. As Europe increases its military production, foreign orders can be phased out. The US has already indicated it expects Europe to buy American weapons, but the more independence Europe achieves, the less it will have to listen to American edicts. Depending on the future security environment, these “filler” systems could be donated to Ukraine if they benefit European security.
Perhaps one of the most complicated issues will be changing the attitude, especially in Germany, towards flexing military might. Drafting the youth of Europe into a national service might be necessary, especially if financial incentives and propaganda are ineffective in boosting enlistment numbers. While personnel numbers in European armed forces must certainly be increased, they are less critical to a certain extent than in prior eras. If we look at the situation in Ukraine, the numerically inferior Ukrainian army has slowed the Russian advance to a crawl using drones.
While the countries of Europe share collective security concerns about Russia, there are significant differences in need. Britain and France maintain a global presence via their overseas territories, which requires a global military presence; Germany does not. The Scandinavian countries and the UK face Russia in the Arctic, while some countries are landlocked. There will be no one-size-fits-all solution for all European NATO countries, but there are common projects that most member nations can contribute to in some way. The ELSA project was initiated in July 2024 by France, Germany, Italy, and Poland to develop a ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometres. Collaboration on sixth-generation aircraft, space capabilities, submarines and surface vessels is an opportunity for Europe to work together.
Ignoring reality, or hoping to wait out current uncertainties, is a gamble Europe can ill afford, as the US cannot be depended on to provide long-term security for the continent. The question for Europe is no longer whether it must increase its defence spending, but whether its leaders and citizens are prepared to bear the significant financial, social, and political costs required to secure their future and sovereignty.
Featured Photo: “Bundeswehr Patriot Missile System”, Wikimedia Commons, 2025