21 November 2024
Turkish leader Tayyip Erdoğan’s re-election last year means the 70-year-old President is now serving his last legal term. Questions have been raised about his future and with it that of a Turkey much diminished after more than 21 years under the thumb of Erdoğan’s incompetent leadership.
Already the tired looking septuagenarian’s allies have already begun ‘suggesting’ (to no one’s surprise) that a constitutional amendment should be considered to allow him to run again in elections set for 2028. This quote from Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is allied with Erdoğan’s ruling AK Party (AKP) is worthy of reproducing here, “Wouldn’t it be a natural and right choice to have our president elected once again if terror is eradicated, and if a heavy blow is dealt to inflation and Turkey secures political and economic stability.” The inflation to which Bahceli refers being entirely the product of Erdoğan’s economic policies is ignored.
Under the rule of Erdoğan and his AKP, Turkey has turned from a dodgy, but largely western orientated ‘democracy’, peppered with military coups and juntas to what is increasingly a hapless theocratic dictatorship bent on distinguishing itself as an independent regional power at the cost of impressing no one and upsetting everyone while turning towards a region largely devoid of any redeeming qualities.
This should hardly come as the surprise. It was only after serving several months in prison on charges of inciting violence and defaming Turkey’s Kemalist secular order that Erdoğan claimed to have changed his views. It was this change and under Erdoğan’s leadership that the AKP presented itself as reformers eager to ditch ideological baggage, running on a platform ready to embrace NATO, join the European Union (EU), and preserve Turkey as a progressive secular democracy in keeping with the principles of Kemal Ataturk.
Instead, what has occurred under Erdoğan’s anti-Western, irredentist, and terrorist-supporting policies has been a dismal decline in Turkey’s international reputation. From relations with Western allies and regional neighbours to its alliances and security networks, every element of Turkey’s international standing under Erdoğan’s authoritarian Islamist leadership has been a total failure.
Following the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War Erdoğan positioned Turkey against those Muslims seeking to cast off autocratic rule by seeking to support the Muslim Brotherhood which he presented as an as organic democratic movement. As part of this misguided policy Turkey has provided aid, weapons, and fighter transits to Al Qaeda-affiliated extremist organizations. Erdoğan likewise chose to overlook the dangers of ISIS due to its opposition to Assad. Erdoğan’s efforts at “strategic autonomy” and presenting Turkey as the region’s superpower have come at deeply damaging its international standing. Major Arab powers for example, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have viewed Turkey’s actions as destabilising and belligerent.
The United States and Europe have become increasingly vocal in their opposition to Erdoğan’s erratic policies. The US in particular has taken great umbrage at many of Erdoğan’s decision. For example, Turkey’s strikes against Syrian Democratic Forces which the US built up as a Western backed anti-ISIS force. Another major issue has been Erdoğan’s deeply troubling decision to purchase the Russian S-400 air defence system which led to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program, US sanctions, and a deepening distrust of Erdoğan in Washington. Yest another example is Erdoğan’s efforts to delay the entry of Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO for rather narrow domestic reasons. Further US sanctions were also imposed after a 2018 standoff over Turkey’s detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson which sparked the first in what was a series of currency crashes for Turkey.
Indeed, Turkey’s economy has faced a steady decline under Erdoğan’s heavy-handed guidance, with the events of the last few years only accelerating this trend, driving it to the point of crisis. This is a point I covered at length in February 2023, prior to the last election and you can find the article here.
Following the October 7 Hamas terror attacks against Israel, Erdoğan has made it a point to actively frame Hamas as freedom fighters deserving of Turkish support, while stressing the anti-NATO nature of this position. He has also been an openly hostile critic of Israeli military operations in Gaza. Only days ago, while returning from Azerbaijan, Erdoğan claimed that he had cut all ties with Jerusalem, a claim denied by Israel’s Foreign Ministry. Turkey’s embassy in Israel is still functioning as usual, while Jerusalem’s diplomatic mission in Ankara also remains open. While Erdoğan has made hay from his anti-Israeli stance, the Israeli Defense Ministry has extended a power supply contract for army bases with Dorad Energy, which is partially owned by a Turkish company, this came two months after Erdoğan declared that he would halt all business with Israel. At this point it’s worth pointing out that Erdoğan is on a charm offensive with President Trump that is likely to fail so long has he maintains his position regarding Israel.
On another front, under Erdoğan’s guidance Turkey has taken an almost incomprehensible approach to Russia. In addition to buying Russian arms, Turkey has faced deep criticisms from allies for not doing enough to stop Russian goods that could be used on the battlefield in Ukraine form flowing through Turkey. The US has responded with sanctions against several smaller Turkish companies for violating export controls. Turkish banks fear of further US sanctions has stimulated new efforts to clamp down on Russia-related business. Despite this, Erdoğan continues to seek to improve ties with Moscow, and has exploited the opening left by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to increase cooperation on trade, tourism, and energy.
Simultaneously Turkey has, to its credit, been a vocal supporter of Ukraine and continues to provide Ukraine with military support despite Russian objections. However, Turkey has attempted to strike a strange and realistically unsustainable balance between Russia and NATO since the invasion of Ukraine, providing Kyiv with armed drones and military support, while also strengthening energy ties with Moscow and opposing Western sanctions. Ankara has also expressed a desire to join the BRICS group. BRICS has stalled the decision on whether to admit Turkey as full member, with the Turkish Minister saying they have been offered “Partner Country Status.” Erdoğan has been alone among NATO in his willingness to remain in discussions with Putin, that was until German Chancellor Scholz’s much criticized call this past week.
If all of this seems confused and contradictory, it’s because it is. Erdoğan and his cronies have completely upended Turkish foreign policy but without any sort of coherent vision of what to replace it with, Instead, only a vague notion of exerting Turkey as an ‘independent’ regional power of great influence has guided decisions that are short-term oriented, clearly opportunistic, and totally unintelligible. The result is that Turkey is today a marginalised and distrusted state, declining in status and influence. As an article from the National Interest pointed out “most Turkish citizens today are now denied tourist visas from Europe.” Erdoğan’s incoherent approach to playing great statesman by attempting to seize every opportunity to be all things to all people has left him as nothing for everyone and put Turkey in the position of falling between two stools. Nothing could be worse for Turkey than another term for the aging and declining Erdoğan, yet I suspect this is exactly what we will see if Turkey’s Western allies don’t go to great lengths to pressure Turkish legislators to stop it.
Feature Photo: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Germany, Russian Presidential Executive Office 2020. Wikimedia Commons, 2024.
Inset Photo: Devlet Bahçeli VOA 2015. Wikimedia Commons, 2024.
DefenceReport’s Analysis and Opinion is a multi-format blog that is based on opinions, insights and dedicated research from DefRep editorial staff and writers. The analysis expressed here is the author’s own and is not necessarily reflective of any institutions or organisations which the author may be associated with.