14 November 2024

In August connected to my writing on Bulgaria’s election woes I dedicated time to exploring the move in Belgrade towards Europe and the ways in which relations with Serbia could prove critical to Balkan stability in the face of a Kremlin increasingly keen to destabilise the region.

A major point of concern is (or should be) resolving the Kosovo-Serbian issue. This will require a course correction in NATO-EU policy. Since the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue was initiated in 2011 under the stewardship of the EU there has been no real success, Serbia still refuses to recognise Kosovo’s independence, Kosovo continues to treat Serbs within Kosovo as a foreign threat. This thorn in the side of the Balkans is rightfully feared to be a target for the Russians who wish to use their influence with Serbia to destabilise the region.

One side effect of the Russian invasion of Ukraine was to bring all members to the negotiating table with a renewed desire for a solution. This resulted in the second Brussels Basic Agreement in March 2023. However, this has all but fallen flat, appearing to be just another European ‘success’ with nothing to show for it. Relations have reverted to back to the default setting of hostile. Kosovo has dragged its heels on implementing the agreed (in 2013) establishment of the “Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASM) for the Northern Serb dominated communities aimed at providing those municipalities a degree of self-government. For Serbia’s part there remain objections to the “de facto and de jure recognition of Kosovo” while Kosovo fears that if Serbia “gets what it wants” that is the implementation of the ASM it will forgo normalising relations with Kosovo.

Xhelal Sveçla, Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Affairs and Public Administration

Adding to Serbia’s growing resistance, the Kosovar Interior Minister Xhelal Sveçla recently announced they would unilaterally re-open the main bridge in the ethnically-divided city of Mitrovica. It has been closed to traffic since the 1998-99 war. The planed reopening has placed Kosovo at odds with their EU and NATO backers. This move has garnered open criticism from U.S. Navy Admiral Stuart B. Munsch, commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Naples – which oversees NATO’s peacekeeping in force in Kosovo. His response was to publicly stress that such a decision needs to occur within the EU-facilitated framework for negotiations. Munch warned that “unilateral actions” pose a risk of inflaming tensions given the current failures in efforts to normalize Serb-Kosovo relations. Reinforcing this message the US Embassy in Pristina expressed its opposition to opening the bridge, stating that it should only be opened after a mutual agreement between Kosovo and Serbia.

Albin Kurti, Prime Minister of Kosovo

The Serbs in Kosovo as well as Belgrade itself are opposed to the bridge opening. The Kosovar Serbs north of the bridge worry its reopening will compromise their security. The Kosovo government counters that another bridge to its east has been open for years. As a counterpoint it’s worth noting that Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti has repeatedly been accused by NATO and the EU of taking rash and unilateral steps concerning Serb-majority municipalities in the north. There is also a considerable amount of evidence to support the Serbs’ concerns. In June of last year, the EU was compelled to impose punitive measures on Kosovo after the government’ attempted to install ethnic Albanian mayors in the northern municipalities following an election boycotted by the Serbs, which in turn led to violent protests. In August of this year Kosovo police shut down several “parallel institutions” which prompted the US embassy in Pristina to accuse the government of “continued instrumentalisation of the Kosovo police to carry out uncoordinated actions”.

Indeed, Albanian dominated Kosovo has on numerous occasions demonstrated its oppressive instincts in dealing with Kosovar Serbs. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo – Report of the Secretary-General from October cites multiple examples of actions taken by the Kosovo Government that have negatively impacted the day-to-day lives of Kosovo Serbs. This has included closing Serbian banks and post offices that have effectively cut off Kosovo Serbs from accessing their salaries, pensions and social assistance from the Government of Serbia. Also included in the report are allegations of police intimidation and questionable arrests.

Aleksandar Vučić, President of Serbia at European Commission France, 2022

Simultaneously Kosovo claims the status of an aggrieved party in response to the Serbian Government’s approval of a bill declaring Kosovo a ‘special area of protection’ and asserting legal jurisdiction over it. Prime Minister Kurti has called it ‘another hostile action.’ The bill in question formalises a set of measures that Serbia President Aleksandar Vucic announced in an address on national television in September at the peak of Kosovo operations targeting Serbia-run institutions. Quite frankly it’s understandable, although troubling and problematic, given the track record of Kosovo. The Serbian Government argues this legislation is necessary to ensure the legal protection of and financial support for the Serbian population in Kosovo. It should also be noted that, far more problematic is that the Serbian government’s further adoption of a draft law on the organisation and jurisdiction of judicial authorities concerning of crimes committed in Kosovo, meaning that Serbia intends to exercise judicial authority over criminal proceedings in Kosovo.

Serbia’s new draft legislation concerning Kosovo has garnered a strong rebuke from the EU and has provoked a response from the Americans through Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s spokesperson, Matthew Miller. In what is a marked departure from their traditionally neutral approach to Kosovo, the Americans have openly voiced support for the EU position that Serbia’s draft legislation claiming legal jurisdiction in Kosovo violates dialogue obligations. Simultaneously the US has urged both Kosovo and Serbia to honor the 2023 agreement with a push for Kosovo to finally establish the Association of Serb-majority municipalities. This is notable in that critics have often pointed to an uneven response from the Americans arguing that Washington and the EU are less vocal in calling out Kosovo’s own breaches of dialogue obligations. The perceived bias does nothing to help advance relations with the Serbs.

The American move to include criticisms of each side represents an interesting potential road marker in events. Many are arguing that governments in both Kosovo and Serbia are waiting to see how European and American political conditions shake out with elections that might produce a more advantageous playing field. Serbia for their part likely welcomes the return of President Trump who is liable to push for a land swap with northern Kosovo being incorporated into Serbia. Kosovo for its part will likely look to Europe in the hopes of continuing the consensus of the Biden administration which they view as better able to ensure the regions security.

The recent EU Country Report for Kosovo paints a fairly grim picture. Relations with Kosovo are strained which leaves Kosovo virtually isolated by the EU. The integration process which is at a key juncture has been stalled with it unlikely to change in the near future. There appears to be little appetite in Europe for the issue. Under these circumstances, the situation remains open to exploitation. A significant portion of the report focuses on the internal instability on northern Kosovo and the lack of progress there, along with the impact this has held for relations with Serbia.

If NATO and the EU want to secure the Balkans and limit Russia’s ability to sow discord in the region a new and more sympathetic track must be taken with Belgrade and Kosovo needs to be dealt with. This appears to be something that is hopefully beginning to come out of the current ‘both-sides’ approach the EU and Americans are taking, recognizing Belgrade’s legitimate complaints while also calling both them and Kosovo to task for failure to live up to what was expected from established agreements. I suspect that during the Trump administration, Kosovo will find itself facing a far less respective audience than it has been accustomed to. In order to move the needle with Belgrade, which is clearly interested in pivoting west they need to see evidence there is a receptive attitude on the receiving end that holds the promise of seeing Serbia’s concerns considered.

This is probably a controversial view but like it or not the reality is that is Kosovo is a by-product of an attempt to avoid dealing with a problem. By kicking the can down the road, an artificial and unsustainable state has been created that is likely untenable given the ethnic divisions between Albanians and Serbs. Whatever solution the future might hold (I suspect the incorporating Serbian communities into Serbia is the best chance) maintaining the status quo with Kosovo is not an option, the situation needs to be accelerated to resolution, lest it serve as the spark used to ignite the Balkans. Doing this will require working with the Serbs and recognizing that the current situation can’t work long-term.

Feature Photo: Iber Bridge, Mitrovica south, 2023. Wikimedia Commons, 2024.

Inset Photo: Xhelal Sveçla, official portrait (2021) as member of the Kosovo Assembly 2021. Wikimedia Commons, 2024.

Inset Photo: Albin Kurti during the first meeting of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo 202. Wikimedia Commons, 2024.

Inset Photo: Aleksandar Vučić, President of Serbia, in France, European Commission 2022. Wikimedia Commons, 2024.

DefenceReport’s Analysis and Opinion is a multi-format blog that is based on opinions, insights and dedicated research from DefRep editorial staff and writers. The analysis expressed here is the author’s own and is not necessarily reflective of any institutions or organisations which the author may be associated with.

By Chris

Chris is the Associate Editor at DefenceReport and Senior Analyst. He holds a PhD in Defence Studies from King’s College London, an MA in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, as well as both an HonsBA in History and a BA in Anthropology from Lakehead University. He specialises in revolt, revolution, civil war, irregular conflicts, guerrilla insurgencies, and asymmetrical warfare. His regions of focus include the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, but are chiefly aimed at the Balkans. Chris is an Associate Member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, a member of the Second World War Research Group at King’s College London and the Sir Michael Howard Centre for the Study of War, as well as an Associate of King’s College London. Chris has formally served as a defence and foreign policy advisor in the Canadian House of Commons to the office of a Member of Parliament. [email protected]