The Ukrainian city of Dnipro was targeted by a new Russian intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV). These missiles are launched into the high atmosphere and before the arc down toward the target.  It was targeting an industrial site – purportedly targeting the heart of Ukrainian missile production. The Dnipro attack obviously did not have a nuclear weapon payload, but the possibility is there when it comes to these systems.

It all started the day before with news that Russia was potentially preparing a RS-26 Rubezh Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The Rubezh does classify as an ICBM (minimum range of 5,500km), but the range of the Rubezh is 5,800km. The Rubezh can carry up to four MIRV warheads. The attack on Dnipro illustrates that there were six and thus rules out that the RS-26 was used.

The attack left two injured and the integrity of the industrial site targeted is not known, which is suspected to be the Pivdenmash Missile Manufacturing site. In addition to this,  some garages were damaged as well as an old age retirement home.

It was a bizarre day on the Russian side, though. The briefing for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was interrupted by a phone call, which was picked up by the podium speakers as if Russians had forgotten about how microphones worked. The caller told the spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, not to comment on the attack.

Russian President Putin later went on television to describe the attack was a new weapon called the Oreshnik or Hazelnut. There is no publicly available information on the capabilities or the development of the Oreshnik. It is believed that it is a 40-ton solid-fueled missile. Putin also illustrated that it was a new non-nuclear, hypersonic weapon. Putin said that it was a response to the recent permission “thawing” of US ATACMS and UK Storm Shadow. Ukraine has succeeded with the limited release of these weapons in the Kursk region. It needs to be noted that Ukraine does not have permission to use these weapons on the entirety of Russian territory that it could. It is yet another limitation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces that provides them just a window to improving a section of the battlefield. Ukraine was only given this permission because of the introduction of North Korean troops in the Kursk region.

In his remarks after the Oreshnik attack, Putin threatened that Russia is willing to attack countries that are supplying weapons to Ukraine. Another nuclear sabre rattling by Russia in a long line of nuclear sabre rattling that this conflict shows. This attack was political and not one with a clear military objective.

By launching a new IRBM, Russia is attempting to show technological prowess and hint at how Russia altered its nuclear doctrine just a couple of days ago. It also signals that Russia is willing to use an arsenal that Russia has not tapped into. Given the trajectory of the weapon and the hypersonic speeds that IRBMs achieve on re-entry, it does suggest that Russia will utilise this classification of weapons more frequently from now on. There are other IRBMs within the Russian inventory.

The response from the West will be a timid one; while Ukraine will have to eventually bear the burnt of another missile classification being unleashed on its population and territory. It will be a very limited stockpile as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and Russia was effective since 1988 and only expired after the US withdrawal in 2019.

 

Feature Photo: Still Image from Inset 1

Inset Video: IRBM Attack of Dnipro 21-11-2024, Ihor Lachenkov, Twitter/X, 2024

Inset Video: Interruption of Russia FA Press Conference, AFP News Agency, Twitter/X, 2024

By Stewart Webb

The editor of DefenceReport and Senior Analyst, Stewart Webb holds a MScEcon in Security Studies from Aberystwyth University and a BA in Political Science from Acadia University. A frequent guest on defence issues for CTV National News, and other Canadian media outlets, his specialities include commentary on terrorist/insurgent activity and Canadian defence issues. Stewart can be contacted at: [email protected]