5 March 2025
Since sitting down to write this article last week a lot happened. The Zelensky-Trump meeting, an appalling commentary on how far the West has fallen. Worse still, since then, Trump has halted all military aid to Ukraine, a shortsighted, disastrous decision for not only the US but the Western world that he and his MAGA crowd claim to be trying to save.
The results for someone, such as myself, focused on the Balkans, have been to force me to reconsider some things. I have a long track record as a vocal critic of Erdoğan. This may have at times led people to think I disliked Türkiye, far from it. It was and remains because I love Türkiye and believe it has a profoundly important role to play within NATO, as I have previously said, that I have been so outspoken.
In the past I have written on how Erdoğan’s efforts to carve Türkiye out as a separate regional power has largely come at the expense of alienating Türkiye from her allies and in the long-term looked like a mistake. My concern was in that charting its own course that Türkiye would be left falling between two stools as, to quote myself, “Erdoğan’s assertive foreign policy, although not entirely unjustified, has been based on exerting Türkiye’s military might as an independent power in its own right, often in contradictory ways.”
However, in light of the West’s utter failure to adequately appreciate and confront the situation in Ukraine appropriately, I find myself feeling the need to write, if not an apology, certainly something of a love letter to Türkiye for the position it has taken concerning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Erdoğan has made clear that Turkey supports Ukraine’s NATO membership. Despite shying away from Western sanctions against Russia, which makes sense from Türkiye’s economic position, even if I don’t like it, Türkiye has also supplied drones, military support and offered itself up as a go-between in relation to the war. This is not to say that I am suddenly a fan of everything Türkiye is doing, and I remain deeply critical of Erdoğan. However I have to admit his policies are starting to make a lot more sense and I think that I haven’t given enough credit where it’s due. I am relieved by that because of the importance I place on the Balkan region and the importance Türkiye plays, or can play in that region.
The Balkans sits on the front line of the war in Ukraine. Viewed correctly by Moscow as NATO and Europe’s weak flank, it remains a central focus of the Kremlin’s destabilization efforts. Balkan leadership in confronting the situation in Ukraine is a critical weapon for NATO and the West which desperately needs sharpening. Currently there remain considerable fault lines and many open questions. If Türkiye can do what Europe seems incapable of doing and act as centre of gravity and lead the Balkans in a clear direction so much the better for the West and we would owe Türkiye our thanks.
The recently minted Bulgarian Prime Minister Rossen Zhelyazkov stressed in discussions with French President Emmanuel Macron two weeks ago that the fate of Ukraine cannot be decided without it being at negotiating table. This is a rather dubious suggestions given the nature of the Russian war and Putin’s self declared ambitions. This is a common talking point within the West and it’s straight from the Kremlin and, forgive me for being blunt but incomprehensibly stupid. To be fair to Bulgaria, it does support Ukraine but has faced a prolonged electoral crisis which has limited what its government feels comfortable doing. An influential group of Bulgarian politicians with a track record of pro-Kremlin positions have pre-emptively rejected any suggestion of offering troops as part of a security guarantee, or peace keeping mission. However, again to be fair to Bulgaria, Bulgaria’s government extends temporary protection for refugees from war in Ukraine.
The point concerning the pre-emptive rejection of troops from pro-Kremlin politicians is not a small one and symptomatic of a problem that plagues the entire Balkan political scene. In addition to a class of Quislings, there remain significant fissures within the region that are open to Moscow to exploit. One such target remains Kosovo which finds itself in a sensitive position. Recent elections undermined Prime Minister Kurti’s position after losing a parliamentary majority, which has led to difficult coalition talks with opposition parties. Tensions between Kosovo and the EU have, justifiably, been on the rise since Kurti took office in 2021 over concerns of unilateral actions targeting Kosovo’s Serb population. His time in office has been marked by sharply heightened tensions with Serbia and Kosovo’s Serb community. Kosovo has faced harsh economic sanctions from the EU since mid-2023, when it became clear to Brussels that Kosovo was incapable of addressing the Serbian situation in northern Kosovo. Additionally, Kurti seems intent on continuing his sovereignty agenda, regardless, recently stating his plan to see Kosovo’s Security Force (KSF) developed into an army by 2028, a suggestion deeply opposed by Serbia.
A potential second mandate for Kurti, is therefore unlikely to bring substantive change to the current situation and leave Kosovo an open question. Alternatively, centre-right parties, have committed to, importantly, improving relations with Serbia and are open to EU and NATO memberships. Whatever government comes from the current coalition negotiations will matter a great deal to the regions future. On point of potential hope is that whatever government it might be, improving relations with the EU which will include normalising relations with Serbia and Kosovo’s Serb community is almost certainly a requirement given the delicate security environment and an adverse US administration in addition to currently frozen US aid. Let’s hope so anyway, if Kurti does manage to form a coalition and score another term as Prime Minister, he past trajectory leaves Serbia a serious question. A centre-right coalition, although less likely would be a preferable outcome.
Relations between Belgrade and Pristina, thanks in no small part to Kurti are delicate. Simultaneously, with Serbia’s lengthy run of anti-graft protests continuing, President Aleksandar Vučić finds himself in a delicate position. With his tenure possibly facing its end a transition to a new government could be in the near future and would have profound impact on the region. Now would not be a good time to see Serbia antagonized by a situation concerning ethnic Serbs in Kosovo which might drive Belgrade away from the West and towards Moscow. Vikto Orbán recently stated that Serbia remains key to Balkan stability. Although I am loathed to agree with Orbán on anything, he’s correct on this point. I however remain dubious of his motivations. Regardless, instability in Belgrade is bad for the region, is a concern or target for the Russians.
In addition to political strife there is also the problem of economics. Elsewhere in the Balkans, every third Macedonian is considering leaving their country as debt reaches record levels (61.9% of the projected GDP) and appears to be increasing at an incredible rate. The EU’s newly launched €7.2 million support programme to accelerate Albania’s EU integration is an example of the sort of investments that Europe and the West more generally needs to be making in the region. However, it goes beyond EU integration and requires more effort to integrate and grow economies and create opportunities for the region. Orbán’s comments for example were made against the backdrop of the planed construction of an oil pipeline between Serbia and Hungary, as well as Serbia’s agreement with Brussels concerning lithium mining. These are the type of projects that will safeguard the region, which Turkey is keenly focused on, with the Balkans being a crucial energy and security corridor linking Europe to the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus.
A major problem facing the region is a major brain drain to the rest of Europe, driven by limited job prospects, lower wages and concerns about political instability. It will take regional players like Turkey and Serbia leading the way, fostering the necessary economic integration, along with Europe accepting and supporting this leadership to safeguard the regions future and stability. There remains tremendous opportunity in the region and many sectors that are very attractive and open to foreign investment, like energy, minerals, shipping, and even IT which if nurtured would make the Balkans not a liability but a strength and part of the solution for Europe. Moving forward Brussels must fix an eye on the Balkans and vigorously engage in strengthening the region and growing its economy. What has traditionally been the ‘powder keg of Europe should instead be sought out and built into Europe’s bulwark. This will however require Brussels to recognize it is an equal partnership in which regional players such as Serbia and Türkiye are critical and must take the lead.
Feature Photo: Official Visit of the President and the First Lady to Türkiye, 2025. Official website of the President of Ukraine, 2025.
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