26 June 2025
It has been a wild few days in the Middle East. As soon as a ceasefire was announced, Israel and Iran traded missiles, and the re-announced ceasefire seems to be holding uneasily. It prompted a very un-presidential media interview with President Trump dropping the F-bomb after dropping 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators. Iran launched the same number of ballistic missiles toward the US Air Base in Qatar afterwards – thus demonstrating some level of retribution symbolism to the Trump administration.
What happens next if the ceasefire holds? It’s been a question many have been asking.
Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu already indicated that the Israeli military would concentrate its efforts to uproot Hamas in Palestine. With the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities, Netanyahu will enjoy an increase in popular support – polls are indicating this, but not even for a majority for his coalition. President Trump is trying to intervene in Israeli domestic politics by demanding the end of Netanyahu’s graft trial. It won’t make a difference, but it does outline the relationship between these two leaders.
Iran
Iranians went to the streets to celebrate the ceasefire and the end of Israeli airstrikes. The regime will survive for another day. Fordow was evacuated before the bombing, and now there are estimates that the bombing did not destroy the facility. Satellite intelligence will indicate how quickly Iran can get the facility back up and running – if it has not been obliterated. The question around the bombing is how many centrifuges and how much enriched uranium were evacuated from the various facilities. There are questions regarding the level of destruction of those facilities. In wargaming models, Iran is able to hide away some enriched uranium and with the Fordow facility being evacuated before the bombing, that scenario arises in real life.
The rebuilding of the Axis of Resistance will be a time-consuming process. The number of missiles, ammunition and infrastructure that Hezbollah lost during Israel’s campaign in Lebanon will need to be replenished and rebuilt. Hamas’ influence cannot be reestablished until after Israel’s campaign is over. The Houthi can be resupplied, but their overall influence has shown to be moderate unless they are fully engaged in shutting down the Red Sea.
Iran can try to sow disorder with terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, as much of its leadership is purportedly in the country. This includes al-Qaeda’s de facto leader Saif al-Adel. But with the fractured franchises and maybe not a clear direction from al-Qaeda Central in Iran and Afghanistan, it is hard to believe that Iran will try to coax the global terrorist group to be an arm of its revenge and retribution against the United States.
It is more likely that Iran will focus on its interests in Africa. In a 2012 report by the Conflict Armament Research, their findings indicated that exported Iranian ammunition has been in present in nine different African states and that “Iranian-manufactured ammunition in service with government forces and a variety of non-state entities, including foreign-backed insurgents, rebel forces, Islamist-oriented armed groups, and warring civilian communities.” Iran’s Africa policy continues, but is fixated on the Sudanese Civil War.
Iran started supplying drones to the Sudanese government in 2008. These were the Ababil-3 drone variants. Iranian drones have since proved to be an essential piece of equipment for the Sudanese government against the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Force (RSF) group. Iranian Mohajer-6 drones played a vital role in regaining control of radio and television buildings that the RSF controlled for over a year. But more importantly, Iranian drones have had a broader impact on the Sudanese civil war, providing intelligence and drone strikes on the RSF.
Iranian relations with the Sudanese government have improved over the past few years. The Sudanese government has been courting the Iranians for military support. Iran aims to assist in the Development of the Port of Sudan, thereby establishing an observation post at the opening of the Red Sea. But Iran is not the only one. Russia signed an agreement granting the Russian Navy access to Sudanese ports. Putin also announced in 2020 that it would construct a base capable of hosting 300 personnel and four warships.
Further Iranian support of the Sudanese government, and Russia’s goals, could also serve as an opportunity for Iran to further improve relations with Russia, in the hope that Russia will eventually supply the aircraft it has pledged, as well as explore the possibility of advanced anti-air missiles, such as the S-400, in the future. There have been multiple rumours that Russia is willing to sell its Sukhoi Su-35 to Iran, with a supposed deal falling through in 2023 and deliveries of the aircraft in 2024, which never occurred. However, if Iran aims to enhance its Air Force and air defence capabilities significantly, it will require an international partner.
Iran’s materiel support of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been documented, including providing ammunition and the Shahed drones and permitting Russia to build them under license. Supporting Sudan has been fortunous for Iran in the past, and continuing to do so and increasing its materiel support will be beneficial for the regime as it attempts to rebuild its military and covertly, its Axis of Resistance.
Feature Photo: “Iranian Mohajer-6 Drone with glide bombs” – Wikimedia Commons, 2025
Inset Photo: “Russian Su-35“, Wikimedia Commons, 2025