1 January 2025
If there is one thing that we at DefRep enjoy – it’s predicting the future, something we are shockingly good at considering the amount of beer and scotch usually involved in these discussions. In keeping with the DefRep tradition below is a list of things we believe it would be wise to watch out for 2025 and the reasons why.
Democracy Turkey Serbia The Caucasus Ukraine United States Canada Korea Mali Libya Afghanistan
Democracy
In the wake of the American election, as part of a Western trend in ‘rejection of status quo’ elections and with many many more coming in 2025 (much like 2024), the obvious place to begin is the historical shift occurring among Western nations in the face of an increasingly unstable geopolitical landscape. The hangover from a generation of not entirely well thought-out ‘progressive’ idealism has brought forward a multitude of totally avoidable and self-imposed domestic problems which are being exploited by Western competitors to subvert the rule-based international order. Furthermore, said policies have generally left an electorate that feels alienated, disregarded, under siege, and under the heel of a largely urban, educated, well-monied (champagne socialist) elite. As these aforementioned self-imposed domestic problems have become acute the inevitable pushback has been weaponized by states like Russia, China, Iran et al. They have done all they can to inflame these issues and in so doing have weakened and distracted the West. As the West turns inward and confronts domestic problems their distraction creates room for bad actors to make moves that will create new and dangerous problems abroad. This increased instability holds the potential to create a feedback loop. This in turn has the potential to push many Western states past the tipping point. When voters look to the successes achieved by non-conformist politicians such as those seen in El Salvador and Argentina, the hunger for systemic change has the potential to totally reshape Western democracy.
Turkey
Erdoğan has served as de facto Sultan of Turkey continually working to concentrate power first as prime minister from 2003 to 2014 and as President since 2014. His popularity and that of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which he co-founded in 2001 has been slowly but steadily losing ground to an increasingly united opposition. Aiding this decline most is the results of his poorly thought out policies aimed at gaining and concentrating power which have had a net negative effect across arguably every metric, particularly the economy. Turkey’s foreign policy appears to be pulled in contradicting directions as Erdoğan tries to carve Turkey out its own place as a major independent regional actor in this ‘new multi-polar’ world. For 2025 Turkey is likely to see increased political instability and terror attacks, it is also likely to find its multi-directional and confused foreign policy endeavours rise to bite Erdoğan. This could hold potentially dramatic consequences for both the region as well as NATO. What 2025 is most likely to bring to Turkey is political instability that could lead to Erdoğan’s much-deserved fall from grace, if that occurs the question for NATO is what follows it in Ankara.
Serbia
The Serbian lithium deal with Brussels and now IMF deal indicate that Putin’s last ally in the Balkans, and last NATO holdout might be turning to the West. The significance of this can not be understated. The Balkans remains the ignored powder keg of Europe and any movement made towards integration, with both NATO and the EU serves as a huge counterweight to instability in the region with the promise of increased economic activity that follows, a much-needed boon for the region. Serbian moves towards Europe offer the EU, and by extension NATO, the promise of increasing stability in the region. This will likely lead Putin to redouble his destabilization efforts there, there is a significant possibility this could only further drive the Balkans West. However, there remain several key fault lines across the Balkans such as the ongoing electoral problems plaguing countries like Bulgaria and the West will need to focus far more energy on the Balkans than it has in recent years. The Kremlin will no doubt pressure Vučić to remain in their camp. Vučić has faced a string of protests that appear to be growing in strength. These seem to be rooted in frustration with the Vučić Government more than anything else and leave open questions of what will come of Serbia in 2025. Mass protests could become a common sight in Belgrade and lead to a change in leadership, or drive Vučić towards either Europe or Russia to reinforce his position. The question of what will happen remains murky, but it seems clear that 2025 holds the potential to be a year of tumultuous change for Serbia.
The Caucasus
In Chechnya, Kadyrov long ago went all-in on Moscow but he’s clearly an opportunist, his power is likely to come under increasing challenge at home with the ongoing war in Ukraine. This will be further driven by the almost inevitable retreat the Kremlin will have to make from the usual financial support in the region as the war in Ukraine continues to grind down Moscow. How this will play out is anyone’s guess. On top of this the Caucasus as a whole is becoming less stable and in addition to a coup followed by a round of repressions or a full-on civil war occurring in Chechnya a major conflict in the Caucasus is just as likely. Georgia is rife with division. Additionally, there remains the question of drone strikes against Chechnya launched from Dagestan and Ingushetia. Any of the above situations going sideways on its own would likely be enough to tip the entire region into conflict and therefore a major conflict in the Caucasus should be on the 2025 watch list.
Ukraine
With Trump’s reelection, it’s safe to say Europe is going to have to start being more decisive and do more of the heavy lifting on Ukraine. However, the East-West divide in Europe is really getting hard to ignore as Germany quite frankly refuses to face reality concerning Russia. With Scholz on the way out it’s anyone’s guess what happens there. Germany represents the West’s worst impulses, the supreme avoidance strategy, kick the can down the road, don’t confront a problem, please just leave us alone. In the coming year you will see a much more intense argument within Europe over what to do concerning Russia that will likely lead to Eastern States like the Baltics and Poland unilaterally take action as Ukraine inevitably goes from bad to worse. This is a very worrying issue for NATO and the EU if it comes to pass. The appearance of uselessness that will result will also sow considerable political turmoil in Germany which is headed for a really painful domestic reckoning (see the first entry on this list). Ukraine will also likely be Trump’s first great failure which will demonstrate that he is not all-powerful and can’t end the war in 24 hours as he bragged about doing. If anything it will highlight the limitations of a Trump America that seeks, more than anything else to retreat into the fantasy of splendid isolationism. If you don’t have skin in the game you really don’t get to have a say over how it’s played.
The Excitable States of America
With the reelection of Trump, already alluded to quite a bit in these other entries, and other ‘rejection elections’ it’s likely the Left is going to start imploding. In the US the more reactionary elements will attempt to attack the mainstream Dems and argue it’s their failure that led to Trump’s resurgence. Alternatively, moderate Leftists will (or at least should, if they are wise and wish to remain at all relevant) start facing reality and purge the radicals. Sooner or later this conflict will run headlong into a question of how to respond to some policy action taken by Trump. One likely result is we can probably expect to see the rise of Left-wing anti-Trump domestic terrorism in the US. This will also carry over to other countries such as Canada (although it is doubtful it will go as far as terrorism there) when the Left begins to eat itself. For the UK this will pose a particularly sticky problem because, counterintuitively, their push away from the left-ish political trends of the West had them protest voting their de facto ruling Tories and running straight into the hands of the Labour Party. They, won by a very narrow margin, have proven wildly unpopular thus far, and are under siege from both their base and from the working class that wanted change…changes largely at odds with the ideological underpinnings of the UK Labour Party. In the UK riots are likely along with a resurgent reactionary right.
Canada
The global trend in ‘rejection elections’ — Canada is a particularly stark example that should be closely watched. Prime Minister Trudeau, perhaps more than any other, represents the most extreme example of the wave of feel-good, virtue-based progressive politics that have dominated Western political discourse for the last decade. Under Trudeau, Canada has leaned hard into progressive narratives concerning issues like immigration, firearms, or the pandemic which led to the now (in)famous ‘Freedom Convoy.’ Unsurprisingly as the pendulum swings Canada’s rejection has been remarkably vitriolic, at least by Canadian political standards. Prime Minister Trudeau’s Government faces a scheduled election in October 2025 but is unlikely to survive 10 more weeks, forget 10 more months. Every opposition party has stated they no longer have confidence in Trudeau’s Government. At present, there are rumours that Trudeau is contemplating his departure. Regardless, it seems likely an election is coming soon. On the socio-political front alone it will be interesting to watch how that rejection plays out. One could reasonably argue that Canada will swing Conservative for at least a generation due to Trudeau. However, there is also an additional practical element that is equally important. Trudeau’s symbols over substance approach to governance have left massive holes in Canada’s defence and national security establishment. For example, 87 percent of all terror suspects stopped at US border crossings were coming from Canada. Likewise, the pressure being put on Canada by NATO members to reach 2% of GDP on defence spending (a dubious proposition under Trudeau) has been remarkably blunt and public. With the election of Trump in the US the pressure that will be directed towards Canada has already increased to remarkable levels. There promises to be significant upheaval in Canada in 2025. Canada faces a major housing crisis and discussions concerning immigration have taken a shocking turn (by Canadian standards). There are 4.9 million visas set to expire in Canada in 2025 which are unlikely to be renewed. In a country of 41 million, this is a historic occurrence. All of this presents an incredibly challenging economic picture overlayed upon a complex and expensive national security picture and tense relations with allies such as the US that promise to make Canada an important country to watch in 2025.
Korea
Although North Korea is a going concern and therefore something of a cliché to add to lists of this type, because it’s always going to be true that it’s something to watch, for 2025 this seems particularly true. The DPRK has been aggressively exploiting Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine to expand its international position. This has several potential consequences. The first is that the loss of North Korean soldiers could spark domestic resistance (unlikely). The more concerning (and likely) is that North Korea will take lessons from observing the West’s lacklustre response to Ukraine that now is the time to become more aggressive in asserting regional influence. Indeed North Korea has already begun conducting joint naval drills with Russia. China’s own intentions to carve out Asia as a strictly Chinese sphere of influence through such actions as those taken against the Philippines over the absurd nine-dash line makes the DPRK a useful proxy ally. Likewise, any Asian distraction that North Korea can create is useful to Russia in drawing Western support and attention away from Ukraine. The result is Moscow is at least as interested, if not more, than Beijing in pushing Pyongyang towards a more aggressive regional position. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) faces its political turmoil as law enforcement seeks a warrant to detain the (eventually) impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol as they investigate whether his short-lived martial law decree amounted to rebellion. This period of internal instability creates a potential opportunity for the DPRK. As to what the North Koreans seek to achieve is anyone’s guess but whatever those ambitions might be it seems reasonable to presume that North Korea will likely step up its regional antagonism in 2025.
Mali
Mali has been one of those conflicts that has been on our radar since the Tuareg and Islamist extremist rebellion of 2012. Under a military junta, Mali’s government has been arresting gold mining executives and Australian and Canadian companies have sought arbitration over disputes with the government. The Russia Africa Corps are still supporting Mali with base development continuing. Conflict between the Tuareg rebels (Azawad Liberation Front – FLA) and Malian and Russian forces continues with the backdrop of terrorist groups, such as JNIM and the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara. These groups have increased their presence in the Sahel. Turkey is now offering arms and drones to the Malian government, which could culminate in another regional influence strife between Turkey and Russia.
Libya
Russia lost its key naval and airbase in Syria with the downfall of al-Assad. Russia will need to strengthen its foothold in Libya to support Russia’s Africa Corps as it will need a stable airbase to conduct supply missions to its interests in Mali, Central African Republic, and Senegal – to name a few. This is something which the Tripoli-based Libyan PM is already resisting, but that will have no real impact as Russia is, and has been, supporting the other main actor in Libya’s ongoing conflict. To have an adequate airbase and naval presence is key for Russia’s African foreign policy and with the stories of the amount of gold and other precious metals that Russia has been taking for its services, it is also key for Russia’s economic health. General Haftar’s forces have been heavily equipped by Russia’s Wagner Group, and now Africa Corps. Haftar stated that he requires Russian air defences to protect his troops. This comes after Turkish-supplied drones targeted his forces in 2020. Haftar recently met with the head of the Egyptian intelligence chief, Major General Hassan Rashad to discuss the future of Libya and recent regional developments. There has been a three-year unstable suspension of hostilities that seems to be coming to an end. Libya will be a focal point again and not just for regional concerns. Whether Russia obtains a better foothold in the country, it seems that the “stable instability” is ending.
Afghanistan
The Taliban are exerting their control over women’s rights and their access to the overall population and by that they are doing exactly what was expected and feared – by severely destroying any women’s rights and freedoms. It also has been a year where we have seen more activity from the Taliban and its allies. The Taliban and Iran entered a new phase of water-sharing tensions with the Taliban blatantly ignoring a treaty that was not fully respected for decades and was established well before the Taliban and Iran’s Islamic government. The security environment of Afghanistan with multiple terrorist groups operating in the country created a spillover of violence which will continue into 2025. In March 2024, Tajiks sworn to ISIS-Khorasan carried out the Crocus City Hall massacre in Russia. More recently, Pakistan launched bombings into Afghanistan after continuing attacks from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan which uses Afghanistan as a shelter. The Afghan Taliban have hinted at referring to them as “guests” which will mean the Taliban will protect them and will as they were allies during the US-led campaign in Afghanistan.
Feature Photo: New Year address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 31 December 2023. Wikimedia Commons, 2024.
DefenceReport’s Analysis and Opinion is a multi-format blog that is based on opinions, insights and dedicated research from DefRep editorial staff and writers. The analysis expressed here is the author’s own and is not necessarily reflective of any institutions or organisations which the author may be associated with.